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Anywhere But Here: An Introduction




Safe hazardous-waste management is perhaps the most impor-
tant environmental issue confronting the country.I Legitimate
fears about the public-health costs of groundwater contamination,
spill episodes and other consequences of improper hazardous
waste management practices have recently led to new federal and
state legislation in an attempt to minimize the risks incident to the
transportation, storage, disposal and treatment of these toxic or
dangerous wastes.2 In 1976 Congress enacted the Resource Con-
* A.B. 1962, LL.B., 1965 Stanford University. Professor of Law, Illinois Institute
of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law-, Visiting Professor of Law, University
of Michigan, spring, 1982. The author wishes to acknowledge the source of his intro-
duction to this area and to express two collective debts of gratitude. During 1979-80,
the author was a paid consultant to the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA),
Washington, D.C., for the purpose of drafting a model state siting statute. That stat-
ute was publshed and distributed by CMA as A Statute for the Siting, Construction
and Financing of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Disposal and Storage Facilities
(1980). In 1981 a version of the model act was adopted in Utah. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 26-14a-1-9 (Supp. 1981). The views expressed in this article are solely the author's
and in no way represent the position of CMA or any of its members. The author
would first like to express his gratitude to all of the members of CMA's Hazardous
Waste Management Task Group who took the trouble to educate him about hazard-
ous-waste management. Since 1980, the author has been a participant in a continuing
workshop on hazardous-waste management sponsored by the Keystone Center for
Continuing Education, Keystone, Colo. He is indebted to Dr. Robert W. Craig, Pres-
ident, and Terry R. Lash, former Director of Science and Public Policy, and to all of
the workshop participants. The views expressed in this article are again solely his
own but, with gratitude, he admits to appropriating freely many insights expressed by
the participants in the workshop meetings.
1. Costle & Beck, Attack on Hazardous Wasic Turning Back the Toxic Tide, 9
CAP. U.L. REv. 425, 433 (1980). In 1980 the Environmental Protection Agency esti-
mated that more than 90% of all hazardous industrial chemical wastes were disposed
of improperly. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980).
2. Storage, disposal and treatment along with resource recovery (recycling) are the
four post-generation management options. TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-6340 (Supp.
1980) reflects the conventional distinctions among the first three options.
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servation and Recovery Act (RCRA)3 which forces states to
choose between the enactment of a qualified state program to ad-
minister federal standards or federal preemption of hazardous
waste management. Most states have elected to administer quali-
fying programs, and between 1976-80 most states passed the nec-
essary legislation to implement RCRA.
In brief, RCRA authorizes the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to identify those wastes that are hazardous, re-
quires that states have a manifest system to keep track of wastes
transported from generation sites to off-site management facilities,
and requires that existing and new on- and off-site management
facilities be regulated through a permit program. The permit pro-
gram is designed to "impose best available management" tech-
niques on facility operators to try to ensure that the facility is
safely designed and operated and that it is safely maintained after
it is closed. Despite these new legislative initiatives, in many
states the success of RCRA is being threatened by a problem that
was not anticipated in 1976. That problem is strong community
resistance to the construction of a new hazardous-waste manage-
ment facility.4
Few communities want to receive a hazardous-waste manage-
ment facility. Every operator who proposes a facility and at-
tempts to show that the facility conforms to all federal, state, and
state-of-the art standards-and thus will minimize exposure to
public health risks-must face the Love Canal problem: people
do not trust hazardous-waste generators, transporters and manag-
ers.5 In many states local communities are free to base decisions
(c) "Disposal" means the final disposition of hazardous waste into or onto land,
water, or air.
(j) "Treatment" means any method, technique, or process, including neutraliza-
tion, designed to change the physical, chemical, or biological character or composi-
tion of any hazardous waste so as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such
waste nonhazardous, safer for transport, amenable for recovery or amendable for
storage.
(m) "Storage" means the interim containment of hazardous waste, in an approved
manner, after generation and prior to disposal.
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
4. See summary of a recent conference on hazardous-waste siting, quoted in [12
Current Developments] ENv'T REP. (BNA) 314-16 (1981)
5. The standard account of the tragedy of Love Canal is M. BROWN, LAYINO
WASTE (1980). The allegation is frequently made that much of the industry, espe-
cially transportation, is controlled by organized crime. The industry, of course, denies
the allegation. See [12 Current Developments] ENv'T REP. (BNA) 202-03 (1981) for
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on the fear of future public health hazards because they have the
power to exclude such facilities through the land-use controls pro-
cess. A hazardous-waste management facility is just another use
to be allocated by zoning, and there is increasing evidence that
communities throughout the country are using their powers to al-
locate land uses to exclude these facilities.6 In response to the lo-
cal opposition problem, some state RCRA qualifying legislation
either impliedly or expressly preempts local land use controls. 7
Several states have gone further and addressed the preemption is-
sue in the context of a special siting process for new or expanded
an account of hearings on this issue before the House Oversight and Investigative
Committee.
6. EXECuTIVE SUMMARY, OPTIONS FOR ESTABLISHING HAZARDOUS WASTE MAN-
AGEMENT FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR MANAGING HAZARDOUS WASTES (RE-
PORT PREPARED FOR THE NEW YORK STATE ENVIRONMENT FACILITIES
CORPORATION) at 11-7 (1979) reports three instances of management facilities that
were blocked by local opposition. REPORT OF THE HAZARDOUS WASTE ADVISORY
COMMISSION TO GOVERNOR BRENDAN BYRNE 21 (New Jersey 1980) concluded that
"[r]ecent experiences in New Jersey and other states raise doubts that private waste
management forms, unless assisted by the state, can establish new off-site treatment or
disposal facilities, due to intense local opposition." For an account of siting problems
in Ohio, see McAvoy, Hazardous Waste Management in Ohio: The Problem ofSiting,
9 CAP. U.L. REV. 435, 447-49 (1980).
7. See infra Part IV. Single-issue preemption is not confined to hazardous-waste
sites. Deinstitutionalization facilities raise the same issues. See Lippincott, 'A Sanctu-
aryfor People' Strategies/or Overcoming Zoning Restrictions on Community Homes
for Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1979). A more exotic form of single-
issue preemption has arisen in Washington, D.C.; Crossette, Days ofProtest, Parties
andPropriety, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1981, at 15, col 4, reports:
The ranks are forming in something other than receiving lines in northwest
Washington's diplomatic neighborhood, where residents are challenging the State
Department on the sensitive issue of where a foreign nation can open its chancery
offices.
Tucked into a section of the State Department authorization bill for the fiscal year
1982 was language that would have the effect of removing from the District of Co-
lumbia's zoning authorities the case-by-case review procedure that can prevent resi-
dential property from being used as diplomatic office space. Should the State
Department get its way, New York City's foreign missions could also come under its
control
The issue here has focused on a house at 2501 Massachusetts Ave. that Ban-
gladesh bought several years ago and proceeded to begin converting into chancery
offices. The Sheridan-Kalorama Neighborhood Council got itself a lawyer.
George Blow of Patton Bogg & Blow, who argued the case, also happens to be a
resident of the neighborhood and a former president of the council.
"We know what happens when a home is sold and converted," Mr. Blow said.
"They take down the curtains, put in fluorescent lights, blacktop the garden, over-
run the neighborhood with cars all day and then desert the place at night. The
ambassadors who live here don't like it any better than we do."
In 1978, the zoning appeals board defeated, 5 to 0, Bangladesh's conversion pro-
posal. The house has since remained vacant. When the counterattack came, it
wasn't from Dacca but from Foggy Bottom.
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hazardous-waste management facilities. However, many states
have chosen not to address the issue, to reaffirm the power of local
units of government (generally counties) to veto proposed sites, or
to allow state preemption only under extraordinary circum-
stances.8 Judicial resolutions of the conflict between local vetos
and state permit programs generally. endorse dual regulatory
schemes.9 Only in one state, Louisiana, did the state court hold
that RCRA and the state's qualifying legislation impliedly pre-
empted local land authority,10 and that decision was quickly re-
versed by the legislature." Nor, except possibly in a few states,
are courts, absent a clear legislative mandate, likely to force a
community to take a management facility on the theory that local
land use powers are subject to regional or statewide duties to take
a fair share of assigned risks.
The thesis of this article is that unrestrained local autonomy
over the location of hazardous-waste management facilities
threatens to frustrate three of the four goals of our national haz-
ardous-waste management policy and therefore the costs of local
veto powers exceed the benefits. Our national hazardous-waste
management policy has the following. four goals: (1) to find a
mechanism to clean up abandoned or "orphaned" sites and spill
episodes and to compensate the victims who suffer injuries from
these sites, (2) to bring existing facilities up to state of the art (or at
least safer) management and design practices, (3) to encourage the
construction of new facilities that use the most environmentally
preferable (or at least safest) management methods, and (4) to en-
8. Eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-124 (Supp. 1981) (two-thirds vote of state
hazardous-waste-facility siting board may override a local veto); FLA. STAT. § 403.732
(1980) (state cabinet) Ill. H.B. 1892, 82d Gen. Ass'y (1981) and S.B. 172, 82d Gen.
Ass'y (1981) would give landfill site approval authority to municipal and county
boards.
9. County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors, 75 Ill. 2d 494, 389 N.E.2d 553
(1979), noted in 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 505.
10. Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police
Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979). But cf. Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F.
Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. 1981). Pursuant to federal EPA and state approval, North Caro-
lina selected Warren County as a disposal site for PCB-contaminated soil. A county
ordinance prohibited the disposal of any measurable amount of PCBs "because there
is a generally high ground water table in the county. . . ." Despite an EPA statement
that local control of PCB disposal was not preempted, 44 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (1979),
issued after the federal EPA approved the site, the district court held that the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629, preempted the local ordinance. The
opinion did little more than quote a brief excerpt from Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435
U.S. 151 (1978), on the power of courts to find implied preemption.
1I. Act 748, §§ 1, 2, 5, 1980 La. Acts (codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 30.1136
C, .1144B, 33.1236 (31) (West Supp. 1981).
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courage generators to recycle the waste stream whenever feasible.
The first goal is partially addressed by the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or
Superfund) 12 and the other three goals are addressed by RCRA.
RCRA's goals run the risk of being frustrated because of the
possibility of the following perverse scenario. Although federal
standards are currently in a state of flux because of the change in
national administrations, whatever standards emerge may require
that many existing substandard sites be closed. The closure of
substandard sites will produce net social benefits only if the wastes
that these sites would have received in the past will now be placed
in environmentally superior sites or recycled. If, however, new
and safer facilities are not constructed to meet the demand, the
closure of substandard sites may encourage generators to evade
RCRA, and state and federal administrators to move cautiously
against substandard existing sites. Midnight dumping and the use
of "substandard" sites may be the net result of closing substan-
dard sites if local communities can block the construction of new
and expanded facilities.
This article examines the existing law of hazardous-waste-man-
agement facility siting and discusses the available methods to ac-
commodate both the states' interest in meeting the demand for
such facilities and the strong and legitimate concerns of local com-
munities about the risks of receiving such a facility. Part I exam-
ines briefly the federal law of hazardous-waste management to
show how RCRA and the EPA's regulations exacerbate the site
shortage problem. Part II discusses the cases which allocate regu-
latory authority over waste-management sites between local and
state government, the cases which impose duties on local commu-
nities to consider regional needs, in local decisions, and common
law causes of action which can be used to bar facilities. This sec-
tion argues that judicial remedies are likely to be ineffective in
achieving the desired balance between state and local interests.
Part III discusses the relevant factors, both scientific and political,
that must be considered in the design of siting institutions. Part
IV surveys the siting mechanisms contained in the recent RCRA
12. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9657 (West 1980 Laws Spec. Pamph. 1981). CERCLA is
a last-minute compromise that provides a fund for clean-up costs incurred by federal
or state governments but does not allow persons injured by wastes from an orphaned
site to approach the fund and does not provide, as did Administration-sponsored bills,
for a federal tort law of industry liability to private parties.
19811
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qualifying laws and sketches the requisites for an improved siting
process.
I.
RCRA AND FACILITY SITING
RCRA regulates existing and new management sites. The
stated policy of RCRA is to provide for the "cradle to grave" reg-
ulation of hazardous wastes, but the effectiveness of the statute is
limited because of structural flaws. RCRA's approach is a combi-
nation of classic broad delegations of legislative power to a pre-
sumably expert administrative agency, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the cooperative federalism approach pio-
neered in the Clean Air and Water Acts. However, unlike under
these two acts the power of states to impose higher standards
under RCRA is unclear.' 3 This is somewhat moot as most states
have chosen to adopt the minimum required by RCRA, but a few
states such as Illinois are beginning to impose higher management
standards.' 4 Subchapter III of RCRA does little more than to di-
rect the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate regulations deal-
ing with the four distinct phases of hazardous-waste management:
(1) transportation off-site, (2) storage, (3) disposal, and (4) on-and
off-site treatment. RCRA is flawed because it neither requires the
most efficient solution to waste management, regional treatment,
disposal and recovery facilities,' 5 nor does it ensure that sufficient
new qualifying facilities will be available.
The simple structure of RCRA results from a congressional de-
cision not to deal with some problems of hazardous-waste man-
13. See Andersen, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 Closing
the Gap, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 635.
14. In 1981 Illinois passed legislation that prohibits the state Environmental Pro-
tection Agency from granting a permit for a hazardous-waste landfill after January 1,
1987 unless "the generator has reasonably demonstrated, that, considering technologi-
cal feasibility and economic reasonableness, the hazardous waste cannot be reason-
ably recycled for reuse, incinerated or chemically, physically or biologically treated so
as to neutralize the waste and render it nonhazardous." S.B. 171 (to be codified at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 11, para. 39(f) (approved by the governor, September 24, 1981).
Governor James R. Thompson's letter approving the legislation noted that in his
opinion "the bill has several flaws" and "It]he delayed implementation date of the bill
will, however, allow representatives of government and industry, as well as environ-
mental groups and interested citizens, to work together to solve these problems and to
effect whatever changes may be necessary to carry out the intent of the law." Letter
from James R. Thompson, Governor, to Members of the Senate and General Assem-
bly (Sept. 24, 1981). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.24 (West Supp. 1981).
15. See Goldfarb, The Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 249 (1979).
[Vol. 2:1I
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agement and to defer making hard choices about other
management options. RCRA is technology-forcing, but the de-
gree of forced innovation differs significantly from the Clean Air
and Water Acts. All of Congress' decisions as to what to leave out
of RCRA contribute to the current site shortage problem.
In enacting RCRA Congress decided to do nothing directly
about controlling the population of hazardous wastes and not to
choose among competing management options, although some are
more environmentally preferable than others. RCRA places no
direct limits on the amount of wastes that are generated because
Congress appears to have been persuaded by the argument that
generators have little ability to reduce the volume of wastes gener-
ated while still responding to market demands for the products
that produce the wastes. 16 However, RCRA is having a substan-
tial impact on many production-run decisions. More stringent
disposal standards are providing incentives to reduce the volume
of waste output by discontinuing product lines and by resource
recovery, but the prevailing assumption remains that society will
have to decide how to handle more safely increased waste
volumes rather than to learn to live without certain products.
A ranking of waste-management strategies in order of environ-
mental preference would probably be (I) recycling, (2) treatment
because the chemical content of the waste is altered, (3) disposa,
and (4) storage. RCRA limits storage of untreated waste to a tem-
porary option, but it expresses no preference among the other op-
tions. Generators may therefore elect not to recycle or treat the
waste for cost reasons. 17 This is often the case and disposal is the
16. This assumption was articulated in GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, How TO
DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE-A SERIOUS QUESTION THAT NEEDS TO BE RE-
SOLVED (1978).
17. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1981, at 13, col. 5. Other proposed treatment technolo-
gies include the use of superoxide, cement-making kilns and ocean burning. There
are presently three converted cargo ships that are used to dispose of waste. One ship,
the Vulcanus, has two ceramic-lined incinerators in the stem, but the stacks do not
have scrubbers since they are not required in international waters. The Vulcanus was
used to burn 10,000 metric tons of agent orange in the Pacific Ocean in 1977. Id. at 2,
col 6. The use of the sea for waste disposal is controversial. Chlorine-laden haloge-
nated hydrocarbons give off hydrogen chloride which becomes hydrochloric acid
(acid rain) when dissolved in water, for example. Current United States laws and
policies severely limit the use of the oceans as sinks, but this general prohibition is
beginning to be reevaluated. See generally, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMirTTEE ON
OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CON-
GRESS, THE ROLE OF OCEANS IN A WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (Jan. 1981);
Symposium, the Oceans as Waste Space?, 24 OCEANUS 2-67 (Spring 1981).
1981]
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most popular option. But nationwide, disposal schemes present
the greatest controversies.
On the whole, allowing waste managers wide latitude in choos-
ing among disposal options is sensible. Resource recovery is only
possible for some but not all wastes. The wide variety of compo-
nents of any hazardous-waste stream necessitates that the "overall
treatment process must be tailored to a specific waste stream and
may depend upon the approach used for the complete spectrum of
wastes being generated within the plant."' 8 No matter how effec-
tive treatment is, it can never be a single option because some por-
tion of the waste stream must be disposed of in landfills. If one
assumes, as have most studies of the state of the art, 19 that all haz-
ardous-waste streams can be safely managed, Congress' refusal in
RCRA to mandate specific treatment and disposal "fixes" is effi-
cient. Relative freedom of choice among compliance options
avoids the inefficient resource allocations caused by the specific
technologies, such as the scrubbers and cooling towers, mandated
by the Clean Air and Water Acts. However, the range of manage-
ment choice allowed does exacerbate the site shortage problem.
Often the least costly alternative, disposal in a secure (lined) land-
fill, will be chosen and local opposition will be excited. Landfills
do not have a good name these days.
In the initial implementation of RCRA, the Carter Administra-
tion EPA gave secondary attention to the problem of site acquisi-
tion. The fragmented and diverse nature of waste generators and
handlers made it very difficult for the EPA to draft RCRA regula-
tions on the problems Congress required to be addressed. Con-
gressional deadlines were missed, suits to compel the preparation
of regulations were filed, settlements were negotiated, and finally
in mid-1980, the Agency. issued its proposed final regulations.20
The proposed regulations focused on three aspects of hazardous-
waste management: (1) the criteria for defining which wastes are
18. RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE, TECHNOLOGY FOR MANAGING HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTES, (REPORT PREPARED FOR THE NEW YORK STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
FACILITIES CORPORATION) at IV-1 (1979).
19. "[Plublished literature on the subject indicates that technologies do presently
exist that can safely handle virtually all components of the hazardous waste stream."
REPORT OF THE HAZARDOUS WASTE ADVISORY COMMISSION TO GOVERNOR
BRENDAN BYRNE 26 (N.J. 1980).
20. EPA, Hazardous Waste Management and Consolidated Permit Regulations,
45 Fed. Reg. 33,063 (1980); EPA, Hazardous Waste Mangement Systems, 46 Fed.
Reg. 2802 (1981). For a discussion of the regulations see Friedland, The New Hazard-




hazardous;21 (2) the manifest requirements for tracing the fate of
wastes that are transported to off-site facilities;22 and (3) the time-
tables for phasing in compliance with various facility standards.23
EPA's proposed regulations are controversial on many accounts.
For example, most generators object to the stringent criteria
adopted by the EPA to classify a waste as hazardous. Part III of
RCRA is fully triggered if the waste is hazardous, and the chemi-
cal industry and others have argued that the criteria are over-in-
clusive. There is no consensus about the proper method for
identifying a waste as hazardous. The Reagan Administration is
reevaluating the Carter Administration's criteria to try to deter-
mine if "degree of hazard" criteria can be developed to limit regu-
lation to a narrower class of wastes that cause substantial health
hazards. This standard would reduce the compliance burden on
generators of wastes that pose marginal public health risks.
The 1980 proposed regulations created great uncertainty for
both existing and proposed facility operators faced with the deci-
sion of upgrading existing facilities or opening new ones because
the regulations failed to provide operators with the critical stan-
dards. One can read the 500-plus pages of proposed regulations
and find no guidance as to what final facility-design standards are
required. One is only told that the standard will be "Best Engi-
neering Judgment (BEJ)" and that this judgment will be revealed
in future guidelines issued over a five-year period that will set
general performance standards that will be applied on a case-by-
case basis.
EPA's primary contribution to the facility-siting problem was to
commission a study by Booz, Allen and Hamilton 24 to survey site
availability in each of its ten regions. Otherwise the agency has
not taken an active role in siting. The study projected possible
1981 shortages in many of the nation's prime industrial areas and
has been widely cited by advocates of greater public involvement
in the siting process. However, the study is not a reliable guide for
policy making because it is too inconclusive. For example, the
Executive Summary concludes, in consecutive sentences, that the
21. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,063, 33,121-22 (1980), codfied in 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.10-.24
(1981).
22. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,063, 33,143-48 (1980), codifled in 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.20-.51
(1981).
23. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,063, 33,156-63 (1980).
24. Booz, ALLEN HAMILTON, INC. & PULLMAN, HAYES & BARTLETr, HAZARD-
ous WASTE GENERATIONS AND COMMERCIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT
CAPACrrY; AN ASSESSMENT, ExEcuTrrvE SUMMARY (EPA, 1980).
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"demand for off-site capacity may increase as EPA's definition of
hazardous wastes expands. Demand for off-site capacity may be
reduced by industry's efforts to reduce the quantities of waste gen-
erated. '25 After its proposed regulations were issued, EPA issued
a paper setting forth the Agency's siting policy: "EPA's policy is
to encourage private sector solutions to the problem of establish-
ing sites. In cases where government involvement is necessary,
EPA believes that the States, either separately or in regional
groups, must assume prime responsibility for the establishment of
adequate capacity. '26
A case can be made for the proposition that the uncertainty
caused by EPA's proposed regulations, combined with the lack of
an effective siting mechanism in most states, have actually con-
tributed to relieve the pressures for new off-site facilities because
the two factors have provided an incentive for generators to avoid
compliance with RCRA by reevaluating product lines and step-
ping up on-site treatment and recycling. But whatever the inad-
vertent effect the chaos created by EPA's initial regulations had on
relieving pressures for new sites, it has been dissipated by the Rea-
gan Administration's approach to RCRA, which holds out the
promise of substantially relaxed compliance duties.
A reevaluation of RCRA is the first priority on the list of gov-
ernment regulations being reevaluated by Vice President Bush's
Task Force. In February of 1981 existing and new facility specifi-
cation standards were recalled. There are many signals-such as
the substitution of weak performance standards for the previous
specification standards for secure landfills, and weakened enforce-
ment-which suggest that the Administration may not push hard
on RCRA.27 If the RCRA regulations are simplified and enforce-
25. Id. at XI.
26. EPA, Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: A Critical Problem 4 (July 1980)
(mimeograph). In 1978 EPA considered various general environmental location stan-
dards that would have prohibited or severely restricted sites over active fault zones,
regulatory flood ways, coastal high-hazard areas, wetlands, critical habitats of endan-
gered and threatened species, sole-source acquifiers and would have regulated the
location of active facilities within the operator's property line. The Agency backed
away from most of these standards in January, 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 2810-18 (1981).
The proposed final regulations prohibit the location of any facility within 61 meters of
a fault line, and any facility located within a 100-year flood plain must either be
designed to prevent a washout or the operator must convince the EPA that the waste
can be removed before the flood waters reach the facility. 40 C.F.R. § 264.18 (1981).
27. 46 Fed. Reg. 11,126 (1981). Actions taken by the Reagan Administration EPA
to modify the RCRA rules promulgated by the Carter Administration EPA will inevi-
tably have the effect of strengthening local opposition to hazardous-waste-facility
sites. As a recent report on siting concludes: "States need a good strong, enforceable,
[Vol. 2:1I
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meat is downgraded, incentives to reevaluate product lines and
recycling may be reduced. A business-as-usual strategy will most
likely intensify local opposition to new sites. Because site opposi-
tion cuts across economic and ideological lines, a weakened regu-
latory program may only stiffen local opposition to new off-site
facilities. Thus, we may be back to the situation that existed prior
to the 1980 regulations. Of course, it is equally plausible that any
regulatory program will be costly enough to comply with that in-
dustry will continue to search for ways to opt out of regulation.
II.
LOCAL LAND-USE CONTROLS OVER FACILITY SITING
The federal government's decision to leave hazardous-waste fa-
cility siting to the states means that the effective power to site a
facility often rests with the community in which the site will be
located. Since zoning swept the country in the 1920's, states have
delegated the power to control the location of most land uses to
cities and counties. 28 The costs of local control can sometimes be
high for a community may fail to take new interests, such as envi-
ronmental protection, into account, or may shift unacceptable
burdens to the rest of the region or state through parochial deci-
sions. In the last decade the so-called "Quiet Revolution" 29 in
land-use controls resulted in many states reclaiming some of their
land-use regulatory powers to protect areas of high environmental
value that were being stressed by rapid development, and courts
have become increasingly willing to intervene to curb perceived
parochialism. However, local communities emerged from a dec-
responsible set of federal regulations in place to base state programs on .. " Spe-
cial Report on Siting of Hazardous Waste Management Facilities" A Major Problem
Facing Industry and the States, [12 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (B NA) 871,
874 (Nov. 13, 1981). The most controversial decision taken to date to undermine
public confidence in RCRA was the decision announced on February 25, 1982. to
allow some use of "containers holding free liquid" in land fills. 47 Fed. Reg. 8807
(1982), but the decision was reversed in less than a month after a storm of public
opposition surfaced at an EPA hearing. [12 Current Developments] ENV'T Rn'.
(BNA) 1476 (Mar. 19, 1982). Such actions, even if reversed, can only serve to make it
difficult for any regulatory agency or facility operator to argue convincingly that com-
pliance with RCRA regulations is sufficient to protect third parties and the public
generally from harm occuring at a site chosen for a facility.
28. Local control subject to a loose reasonableness check on parochialism was
sustained in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
29. See F. BOSSELMAN & D. COLLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE
CONTROLS (1971). J. POPPER, THE POLITICS OF LAND-USE REFoRMt (1981) is a bal-
anced assessment of the "Quiet Revolution" that stresses the revolution's important
but ultimately limited achievements.
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ade of legislative and judicial activism with their land-use controls
authority substantially intact. States are making some efforts to
curb local authority to veto new and expanded hazardous-waste
management facilities, but the preemption of local authority is
usually only partial in theory or in practice. Most of the recent
siting statutes merely shift the problem of curbing local exclusion
from the courts to administrative agencies. Even in the states that
preempt local land use controls it is useful to understand the ex-
isting law to resolve conflicts between local self-interest and claim
of a broader public interest in order to understand the preemption
decisions agencies are called upon to make. Therefore, this sec-
tion analyzes the cases curbing the power of a local community to
veto a use simply to avoid assuming the health and other risks
attributable to the site. The fourth section will examine recent
hazardous-waste-facility siting legislation.
Any decision to site a hazardous-waste management facility
must accommodate two conflicting interests. These are: (1) the
state interest in reconciling industrial growth and public health
protection through the provision of an adequate number of safe
facilities and (2) the local interest in the health and safety of those
who will be most directly exposed to the facility. The two interests
are likely to conflict because the state, with its dual objectives, will
have a higher tolerance for safety trade-offs. Hazardous-waste
management facilities are capital- rather than labor-intensive and
generally do not offer much of a tax bonanza to local communi-
ties. There is even evidence of resistance to expanded and new
facilities in already industrialized areas. In short, there is a mis-
match between those who benefit from the waste-generating prod-
ucts and those who are exposed to the adverse impacts of the
facility. As a result, public and private operators will find it diffi-
cult to "bribe" their way into communities by offering extra-ordi-
nance improvements.30 A hazardous-waste management facility
is not a planned unit development.
The conflict between state and local interests is further compli-
cated by different perceptions of the problem. State agencies re-
sponsible for licensing and siting facilities are likely to have
greater confidence in engineering judgments and to be more will-
30. New York chose a small community north of Syracuse for a 2,800-acre treat-
ment plan to be constructed by the state. Local opposition was strong; "[t]here was
considerably more support for a nuclear power plant that was proposed and later
withdrawn for the same site. The nuclear plant would have at least provided jobs and
increased property values. ... N.Y. Times, May 31, 1981, § 1, at 35, col. 1.
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ing to live with uncertainty. Local interests are likely to be skepti-
cal of claims that the facility is as safe as one can design it, and are
less willing to tolerate risk. Many claim that local interests are
"irrational" because they are unwilling to view the problem as pri-
marily a "technical" one.
Absent an express legislative preemption, local units of govern-
ment have great discretion to veto the entry of a hazardous-waste
facility because such a facility is just another land use to be regu-
lated by applicable zoning ordinances. A persistent theme in local
government and land-use law is that a community's first duty to
its citizens is to protect their health and welfare. This theory of
local self-interest has been sustained by the Supreme Court and
state courts.31 As a result, it is difficult for courts to develop an
effective law of local duties to consider extra-local interests.
What relevant law that exists is drawn from two related lines of
cases. First, there are those cases that deal with the question of
whether an "intruder" governmental unit or licensed private en-
tity which wishes to enter a community that has vetoed the activ-
ity by its zoning ordinance is immune from the "host"
community's land use controls. The second line comes from the
scattered precedents which impose some duty on a community to
take regional or statewide interests into account in its land-use
policies.
Waste-management sites are generally operated by public enti-
ties or by private persons licensed by the state. Both public enti-
ties and state licenses have traditionally been able to take
advantage of land-use controls doctrines that grant immunity to
such "intruders". Courts originally followed a series of abstract
tests that make the immunity question turn on the presence of at-
tributes of power. Under those tests courts have granted immu-
nity when the "intruder" possessed the power of eminent domain,
was acting in a governmental rather than proprietary capacity,
and was higher in the hierarchy of governmental units. 32 Both
county operated landfills and state licensees fared well under these
31. In sustaining extra-territorial regulations against an argument that it violates
the one-man, one-vote rule, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he Alabama Legislature
could have decided that municipal corporations should have some measure of control
over activities carried on just beyond their 'city limit' signs, particularly since today's
police jurisdiction may be tomorrow's annexation to the city proper." Holt Civic
Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 74 (1978). See also [1978] Op. IlL Att'y Gen.
165.
32. See D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A
FEDERAL SYSTEM 416-18 (1977) (collection of the leading cases).
1981]
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
tests. 33 In recent years courts have responded to the argument
that the abstract tests for immunity do not take into account the
legitimate interests of the host government in using its land-use
control powers to protect the health and welfare of its citizens. 34
Recent courts are replacing the abstract tests with a more func-
tional balancing approach, but balancing means different things in
different jurisdictions. A line of cases, stemming from a landmark
1972 New Jersey case,35 balances five factors to determine if the
legislature intended to grant immunity or if the "intruder" should
be immune regardless of legislative intent.
The factors are weighted toward a finding of immunity, and the
practical effect of the New Jersey balancing test is to create a re-
buttable presumption of immunity. A "host" community may
only rebut the presumption by showing that the "intruder's" land
use choice is unreasonable as measured either by "host's" existing
land use patterns or, one would assume, by the exposure of the
public to unreasonable risks.36 As announced in New Jersey, the
balancing test is simply a theory of implied preemption.
A second line of balancing cases from Florida37 starts from the
opposite presumption. That is, the "host" community's interests
are stronger than the "intruder's", and state authorization of the
activity is not presumed to be an implied grant of immunity. In
other states such as Illinois, the state's broad theory of home rule
has been relied upon to reach this result.38 Under this balancing
33. Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W. 2d 426 (1972)
(dictum) (solid-waste facility); Unitarian Universalist Church v. Shorten, 63 Misc. 2d
978, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (state licensee).
34. See, e.g., Rutgers, The State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972).
See generally, Note, Governmentat Immunity from Local Zoning Ordinances, 84
HARV. L. RaV. 869 (1971) for an early statement of the balancing argument.
35. Rutgers, The State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972). The
factors are (1) the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity, (2) the
kind of function or land use involved, (3) the extent of the public interest to be served
thereby, (4) the effect local land-use regulation would have on the enterprise con-
cerned, and (5) the impact on legitimate local interests.
36. Ross, Intergovernmental Zoning Disputes: A Continuing Problem, 32 LAND
USE L. & ZONING DIG. 6 (July 1980).
37. Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 322 So. 2d 571,
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), af'd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976). Accord Brown v. Kansas
Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102, 576 P.2d 230 (1978).
38. County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors, 75 IM. 2d 494, 389 N.E.2d 553
(1979). The State Environmental Protection Act does not preempt the host's zoning
laws when the host is a home-rule unit. Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 I11. 2d 406,




test, the burden is on the "intruder" to show that the "host" com-
munity acted unreasonably in applying its zoning ordinance. The
"intruder" must show that "the public interests favoring the pro-
posed use outweigh those mitigating against a use not sanctioned
by the zoning regulations of the host government. To rebut an
exclusion, the intruder can show that there was no good-faith ef-
fort to accommodate the use, that suitable sites for the use exist in
the community, and that mitigation measures are possible at the
chosen site."' 39 This approach favors local veto power, especially
when it is supplemented, as it has been in a recent line of cases
dealing with non-hazardous and hazardous waste landfills, with
the theory that state and local regulation perform different but
complementary functions. Courts have increasingly adopted the
theory that state permit programs focus more on general facility
design and operation procedures than on the analysis of site-spe-
cific risks.4° Local-land use regulations are therefore complimen-
tary because they fill a regulatory "gap" and supplement rather
than frustrate the goals of state licensing statutes. As has been
previously mentioned, only a Louisiana court concluded that
RCRA and state-qualifying legislation preempted local regula-
tion,4' and the legislature was quick to reverse that decision.42 Ju-
dicial approval of local land-use authority will not, of course,
make the conflict between local and statewide interests disappear.
The balancing and regulatory gap theories should be best viewed
as stop-gap measures devised by the courts to resolve "intruder"-
"host" tensions until the legislature provides clearer guidelines for
39. City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens 322 So. 2d
at 579.
40. See id at 513, 389 N.E.2d at 559; Nelson v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 88
Wis. 2d 1, 276 N.W.2d 302 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
41. Rollins Environmental Serv. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127
(La. 1979).
42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1236(31) (West Supp. 1981). There is no doubt that
"home rule" is a general concept that commands substantial political support at the
state level, but the case for local autonomy is not well developed. One recent analysis
offers three justifications for home rule: (1) the provision of municipal services on an
efficient scale; (2) the benefits of local representation; and (3) the promotion of indi-
vidual choice. Lefcoe, California'r Land Planning Requirements.: The Case For Dereg.
ulation, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 447, 448-56 (1981). Professor Lefcoe finds that the third
justification is the most persuasive generally. The promotion of individual choice is a
powerful rationale for allowing local communities to decide the level of risk exposure
because it is their citizens who are most directly affected by a hazardous-waste facil-
ity. However, where self-interest will not compel a party to take into account the full
costs of such a decision, here zero or minimum risk, there is a case for intervention at
higher levels of government.
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the courts or enacts a more comprehensive accommodation
procedure.
The need for state action has been underlined by the Supreme
Court's 1978 decision in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.4 3 The
case holds that RCRA did not preempt the states' power to control
the siting of hazardous-waste-management facilities, but that a
state ban on the importation of wastes generated out of state is a
violation of the negative commerce clause doctrine. New Jersey is
a classic example of a state statute that discriminates against inter-
state commerce on its face, and the Court brushed aside New
Jersey's argument that the legislation was a valid quarantine.
Since a state does not have a right "to saddle those outside the
State with the entire burden of slowing the flow of refuse "into
[its] remaining landfill sites," 44 it must follow that a state has a
duty to accept its fair share of wastes wherever generated.
If the state land-use law favors "host" over "intruder" commu-
nities and the legislature does not preempt local authority, then
the tension between local and statewide interests must be resolved
in the courts. Such judicial conflicts can be seen as the logical
consequences of judicial weakening of abstract rules of govern-
ment and license immunity. In recognizing greater local discre-
tion, courts have created more municipal power that can be
exercised in an unreasonable manner and thus have created the
need for further judicial intervention to adjust the balance be-
tween state and local interests.
In recent years courts have struggled to develop a theory of lo-
cal duties to accommodate regional interest in formulating com-
munity land-use policies.45 There are two branches to this law.
The first concerns the power of communities to "exclude" those
seeking a more diverse housing mix than the community wishes to
provide. A discussion of the law of exclusionary zoning is beyond
the scope of this brief article, 46 but suffice it to say that experi-
ments in judicial activism are likely to influence the court's treat-
ment of the second branch of the law which is directly relevant to
this article. The second branch of law deals with the powers of
communities to exclude a particular land use from the commu-
43. 437 U.S. 617 (1980). Accord Hardage v. Atkins, 619 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1980).
44. 437 U.S. at 629.
45. See generally Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land- Use Planning, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 515 (1957).
46. See Blumstein, A Prolegomenon to Growth Management and Exclusionary Zon-




nity. In the late 1960's, housing consumers and their developer
surrogates had some color of constitutional right to assert in at-
tacking exclusionary zoning.47 The Supreme Court has subse-
quently made it clear that it does not want to "constitutionalize"
the law of zoning, and there is nothing in the Standard Zoning
Enabling Act or in the "common law" of zoning that says that
every community must accept every kind of use that wishes to
enter.48 State legislatures have not expressly decided that each
community in a state shall be a Noah's Ark. But, courts have al-
ways been sensitive to the use of zoning power to exclude undesir-
able persons and uses, and something of a law of use exclusion has
developed. Courts which have been confronted with single use as
opposed to housing consumer exclusionary ordinances have de-
veloped three positions. First, they have allowed small communi-
ties to chart their own destiny as they see fit;4 9 second, they have
imposed a duty on communities to explain an exclusion and to
take one of almost everything or least one of the uses seeking to
enter, if the explanation fails;50 and third, they have allowed com-
muhities to use reverse-regionalism arguments. A community
may exclude those uses that are adequately provided for else-
where in the region.51 One ark per region is enough.
Judicial intervention to compel a community to explain an ex-
clusion, and thus accept an unwanted use if the explanation is not
convincing, must be justified on one of two theories, if it can be
justified at all. The first theory proceeds from the premise that
any property owner who is denied the right to locate has arguable
substantive due process claims. Most zoning restrictions can be
justified by the reciprocal benefits to the complainants and sur-
rounding parcels created by the zoning ordinance. But, an exclu-
sion is often difficult to justify under the reciprocity of benefit
theory, and therefore judicial intervention is necessary to protect
the excluded property owner's constitutional rights. A second jus-
tification could be based on a theory that an exclusionary zoning
ordinance is presumptively ultra vires. Courts have sometimes ar-
ticulated a theory that the essence of zoning is the division of a
47. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 822 (1981).
48. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
49. See McDermott v. Village of Calverton Park, 454 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1970).
50. Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Osborne Borough, 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971).
See generally Feiler, Metropolitanizaion and Land- Use Parochialism--Towarda Judi-
calAttitude, 69 MICH. L. REv. 655 (1971).
51. Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955).
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community's territory among different land uses.52 An ordinance
that omits an ordinary, non-noxious, land use is thus presump-
tively ultra vires because it lacks the necessary
comprehensiveness. 53
Pennsylvania courts have developed a doctrine which seems to
incorporate both these theories. If a community excludes a legiti-
mate land use, the community bears the burden of justifying the
exclusion as necessary to protect the public interest.5 4 It appears
that technically the court has considered an exclusionary ordi-
nance aprimafacie case of unreasonable zoning and has shifted
the burden of going forward to the community. The Pennsylvania
courts have recognized an exception for activities "generally
known to give off noxious odors, disturb the tranquility of a large
area by making loud noises, have the obvious potential of poison-
ing the air or the water of an area, or similarly have clearly delete-
rious effects upon the general public. . .,5 This exception would
seem to describe hazardous-waste management facilities, but a
lower court has held that a community failed to carry its burden
of justifying the exclusion of an industrial waste processing facil-
ity.5 6 In reversing the Zoning Hearing Board, the court made the
following statement: "Under these circumstances, we conclude
that waste disposal facilities do not have the obvious potential for
polluting air or water or otherwise creating uncontrollable health
or safety hazards. Nor do common knowledge and experience
suggest other clear deleterious effects which would inevitably be
visited upon the public in general.' '57 One wonders whether it
would be repeated in other states or again in Pennsylvania now
that more information about hazardous-waste disposal has come
to light.
Since 1965 Pennsylvania courts have developed strong anti-ex-
clusionary zoning doctrines in the name of manifest destiny or so-
cial darwinism. The court's theory seems to be that development
will occur and every area of a metropolitan region is equally
52. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 46, at 793-95.
53. See Justice Heher's dissenting opinion in Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118
A.2d 401 (1955).
54. Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Osborne Borough, 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971).
55. Id. at 576, 285 A.2d at 509.
56. General Battery Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 498, 371
A.2d 1030 (1977).
57. 371 A.2d at 1032. Local vetos of hazardous-waste facilities are now preempted
in Pennsylvania. See infra note 123.
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suited for more development.58 This may be a reasonable as-
sumption for apartment houses, townhouses and condominiums,
but it is not a reasonable assumption for hazardous waste manage-
ment facilities. Pennsylvania's anti-exclusionary rules give insuffi-
cient weight to legitimate local interests and impose too many
potential risks on local communities in the interests of protecting
landowner initiatives.
Just as a balancing test to determine whether an "intruder" is
inmmune from the "host" community's land-use regulations can
weigh the interests differently, so can judicially imposed duties to
consider regional or statewide interests. In Associated Home
Builders v. City of Livermore 9 the California Supreme Court sug-
gested that substantive due process required that cities justify
growth control ordinances likely to be exclusionary. Ordinances
"must have a real and substantial relationship to the public wel-
fare. ."60 However, Washington followed California's regional-
ism theory with an interesting twist. A recent case suggests that a
community may have a duty to exclude a use which is environ-
mentally detrimental from a regional perspective. Save a Valuable
Environment v. City of Bothel 61 found that a community's deci-
sion to allow a regional shopping center in a rural but growing
area of the Seattle metropolitan area "was arbitrary and capri-
cious in that it failed to serve the welfare of the community as a
whole."'62 Once adverse regional environmental impacts are dis-
closed, a city
may not act in disregard of the effects outside its boundaries. Where
the potential exists that a zoning action will cause a serious environ-
mental effect outside jurisdiction borders, the zoning body must
serve the welfare of the entire affected community. If it does not do
so it acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The precise bound-
aries of the affected community cannot be determined until the po-
tential environmental effects are understood. It includes all areas
where a serious impact on the environment would be caused by the
proposed action. The impact must be direct. For example, areas
which would experience an increased danger of flooding or air pol-
lution, or areas which would experience pressure to alter the land
uses contemplated by their own comprehensive plans, would be part
58. The leading case is National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of
Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
59. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 609, 557 P.2d 473, 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 57 (1976).
60. Id.
61. 89 Wash. 2d 862, 870, 576 P.2d 401, 405 (1978).
62. Id.
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of the affected community.63
A common-law nuisance action to enjoin the construction or
operation of the facility may provide communities with another
means64 of excluding a facility than land-use controls. However,
under conventional nuisance law, it is extremely difficult to enjoin
any facility in advance of its operation because of the doctrine ofimminent irreparable harm.65 This doctrine rests on the theory
that an activity is not ripe for evaluation as a nuisance until the
operators have had a chance to prove that it can operate reason-
ably. If the facility is a public one, a second doctrine virtually
immunizes public or licensed activities from pre-construction in-
junction suits. There is an almost conclusive presumption that the
balance of equities lies with the public interest in the operation of
the facility.66
These doctrines are still good law, but in recent years courts
have begun to substitute risk for proof of cause in fact and the law
of imminent irreparable injury has begun to change accordingly.
The decisions initially involved legislative and administrative dis-
cretion to protect the public from health risks such as cancer, 67 but
the courts are beginning to lower the quantum of proof necessary
to prove future harm in actions for injunctive relief. A recent Illi-
nois Supreme Court decision, Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv-
ices, Inc. ,68 illustrates the developing law of equitable risk-benefit
analysis. The village sued to require the removal of a hazardous
waste landfill, and the trial court granted an injunction after a
104-day trial on the merits. As is usual in such cases, expert testi-
mony was sharply divided on the risk of future harm that the
landfill in fact posed, but the trial court granted the injunction
even though it found that the likelihood of substantial future
harm was remote. An intermediate appellate court affirmed be-
cause of the nature of the hazard involved.69 The state supreme
court affirmed in the face of an argument that the two lower courts
had incorrectly "failed to require a showing of substantial risk of
63. Id. at 869.
64. 89 Wash. 2d at 869, 576 P.2d at 405.
65. Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 181 Colo. 309, 509 P.2d 588 (1973).
66. Brent v. City of Detroit, 27 Mich. App. 628, 183 N.W.2d 908 (1970).
67. E.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (en banc 1976).
68. 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981). For a fuller discussion of the controversy
see Ill. Legislative Investigating Comm., Land Filling of Special and Hazardous
Waste: A Report to the Illinois General Assembly 172-203 (1981).




certain and extreme future harm. ' 70 But, its reasoning will create
some future confusion. Instead of directly addressing the question
of when a court may base an injunction on proof of risk as op-
posed to relatively certain injury, the court found that the evi-
dence met the conventional standards of "real and immediate"
danger. However, the court's summary of the evidence and the
law leaves little doubt that courts now have more discretion to
resolve the uncertainty issue in the public's favor when hazardous
wastes are involved:
In this case there can be no doubt but that it is highly probable
that the chemical-waste-disposal site will bring about a substantial
injury. Without again reviewing the extensive evidence adduced at
trial, we think it is sufficiently clear that it is highly probable that the
instant site will constitute a public nuisance if, through either an
explosive interaction, migration, subsidence, or the "bathtub effect,"
the highly toxic chemical wastes deposited at the site escape and
contaminate the air, water, or ground around the site. That such an
event will occur was positively attested to by several expert wit-
nesses. A court does not have to wait for it to happen before it can
enjoin such a result. Additionally, the fact is that the condition of a
nuisance is already present at the site due to the location of the site
and the manner in which it has been operated. Thus, it is only the
damage which is prospective. Under these circumstances, if a court
can prevent any damage from occurring, it should do so. t
III.
CRITICAL ISSUES IN SITING
The ultimate goal of a hazardous-waste facility-siting process is
the location of facilities at acceptable sites. An acceptable site can
initially be defined as one that is determined to be safe by the
appropriate regulatory authority. This definition of safety is, of
course, a positivistic one for it defines a site as safe simply because
a duly constituted public agency says that it is safe. Nonetheless,
it is useful to start with this definition of safety because ultimately
it may be the best that society can devise. But it is equally neces-
sary to realize the limits of this definition.
The true test of a regulatory institution's value is whether it can
persuade those interested in its activities that its decisions are le-
gitimate. Proponents of the administrative state, brought to full
flower in the New Deal and Great Society eras, hoped that agen-
70. 86 IlI 2d at - 426 N.E.2d at 824, 836 (1981).
71. Id. at - 426 N.E.2d at 836-37.
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cies would develop sufficient expertise to convince the public that
the right decisions were being made.72 This has proved to be diffi-
cult or impossible to accomplish in many instances because no
consensus has developed about what regulatory policies ought to
be pursued. In other instances, such as environmental regulation,
there has been a reasonably broad initial consensus about the ba-
sic objectives of the regulation, but often agencies have been un-
able to generate the information necessary to demonstrate that a
particular rule or decision is necessary to further the general goal.
Hazardous-waste management is a classic example of this prob-
lem. It is hard to generate sufficient data either to convince the
operator that stringent safety measures are necessary to protect
public health or to convince the public that risk exposure has been
adequately minimized. As a recent report by the Keystone
Center's Hazardous Waste Management Study Group concluded,
that because of the uncertainties that surround hazardous-waste
decisions, "some people's exaggerated perceptions about risk,
however, may be the most serious obstacle to successful siting of
new facilities. ' 73 In short, one cannot expect that those potentially
affected by the location of a facility will be convinced that the
facility is safe.
A lawyer's or institutional analyst's initial response to the lack-
of-legitimacy problem is to try to finess it by substituting fair pro-
cedures and processes for the lack of substantive rightness. It is
hoped that interested parties will more readily accept the decision
if there has been an opportunity to question the assumptions be-
hind the data and scientific conclusions. In designing newer insti-
tutions for resolving environmental conflicts we have recently
moved beyond limited and formal opportunities to question deci-
sions into the amorphous area of "effective public participation".
Legitimacy has become identified with enhanced opportunities for
public "input", although the ability of any process to produce con-
sensus when there are such radical differences among the inter-
ested parties is limited. Nonetheless, siting statutes increasingly
strive for enhanced public participation as a means of promoting
legitimate decisions. A few states have even moved beyond open-
ended processes and have begun to experiment with mediation
and arbitration to give interested parties a formal stake in the de-
72. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 25-46 (1938).
73. Keystone Center, Final Report of the First Keystone Workshop on Siting
Nonradioactive Hazardous Waste Management Facilities 21 (Sept. 1980) (mimeo-
graph copy on file with author).
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cision. This section discusses the basic approaches to convincing
the public that a siting decision is legitimate.
The first generation of siting statutes, exemplified by Michigan's
1979 pioneering statute, view the decision as primarily a technical
one. The siting board is to consider the following factors:
(a) The risk and impact of accident during the transportation of
hazardous waste.
(b) The risk and impact of contamination of ground and surface
water by leaching and runoff from the proposed disposal facil-
ity.
(c) The risk of fires or explosions from improper storage and dis-
posal methods.
(d) The impact on the municipality where the proposed disposal
facility is to be located in terms of the health, safety, cost and
consistency with local planning and existing development.
The board also shall consider local ordinances, permits, or
other requirements and their potential relationship to the pro-
posed disposal facility.
(e) The nature of the probable environmental impact, including
the specification of the predictable adverse effects on the fol-
lowing:
(i) The natural environment and ecology.
(ii) Public health and safety.
(iii) Scenic, historic, cultural, and recreational value.
(iv) Water and air quality, and wildlife.
(f) An evaluation of measures to mitigate adverse effects.
(8) The board also shall consider the concerns and objections
submitted by the public. The board shall facilitate efforts to
provide that the concerns and objections are mitigated by
establishing additional stipulations specifically applicable to
the disposal facility and operation at that site. The board also
shall to the fullest extent practicable integrate by stipulation
the provisions of the local ordinances, permits, or require-
ments.74
Public participation is confined to the traditional hearing-consul-
tation model.
In more recent legislation, non-technical criteria are upgraded
and more detailed and innovative public participation techniques,
discussed in the next section, are mandated. Perhaps Kentucky
has gone the farthest in recognizing the legitimacy of non-techni-
cal concerns. The licensing agency is required to consider "coin-
74. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.520(7)-(8) (1980). See also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 115A.20 (West Supp. 1980).
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munity perceptions and other psychic costs."75 Predictably,
Minnesota and Massachusetts have attempted to move beyond
formal public participation models to something more effective. 76
Public participation beyond the electoral process has become
the vogue as the legitimacy of formal institutions has declined, but
the goals and techniques of participation remain quite vague.
Lawyers schooled in due process have equated public participa-
tion in the administrative process as the right to be heard, but
have not been greatly concerned, outside of formal adjudication,
as to how much the hearer listens to the participation and what
effect the participation has on the participant. Those schooled in
behaviorism theories and the nondiscipline of "communication
skills" have paid more attention to the quality of the participation
and, as a result, find formal adjudication and rulemaking models
too restrictive. The basic objections are that the participation
comes too late and is not conducive to reaching consensus about
the best overall decision.
There are at least six models of public participation available
for the consideration of those designing siting institutions. They
can be defined as: (1) minimum formal public participation;
(2) enhanced formal public participation; (3) enhanced formal
participation in a planning process that preceeds regulatory deci-
sions; (4) formal due process; (5) direct electoral participation; and
(6) interest representation in nonlegislative and adjudicative
processes.
Minimum formal public participation is simply a nonadjudi-
catory or speechmaking hearing, with or without a record. This
model is widely used, but the defects are obvious. People seldom
feel that such a hearing adequately involves them in the decision.
Enhanced public participation involves a greater effort to involve
the public in the proceeding at the relatively early stages of deci-
sion making. This technique is being increasingly used in the con-
sideration of environmental impact statements, for example, and
is required in the siting statutes in Massachusetts and Minnesota.
The salient features of enhanced public participation include
targeted notice, hearings held in the locality of the proposed facil-
ity, advance distribution of relevant documents and multiple hear-
ings. A few states have sought to move the effective decision point
from the permit application to a general site indentification plan-
75. Ky. REv. STAT. § 224.866(1)(c) (Supp. 1980).
76. See supra note 74.
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ning process. The theory is that technical criteria can be used to
weed out sites that are technically and politically unacceptable
and to find sites that are more acceptable by both of these crite-
ria.77 Formal due process is simply an adjudicatory hearing.
Some siting statutes require an adjudicatory hearing before a per-
mit is granted. 78 Parties who meet the jurisdiction's rules for in-
tervention or standing may become formal parties to the
proceeding. However, the burden is on the interested party to in-
cur the costs of joining the proceedings so the level of non-permit-
tee interest will often depend on the existence or strength and
interest, of a citizens organization.
Direct electoral participation through the initiative and referen-
dum is perhaps the most favorable means of public participation
for those who oppose a facility. There is no requirement that
those entitled to vote in a valid election act at all rationally. The
lack of voter rationality is a problem with any election, but the
problem is magnified with single issue, limited electorate elec-
tions. Although the issue is controversial, my own view is that the
initiative and referenda should not be used to site hazardous-
waste facilities because there is too great a risk that permittee and
statewide interests in an adequate disposal capacity will be
ignored.79
Many people dislike the adversary process because it focuses on
the wrong issues. Since the mid-1970's, some people have been
searching for ways to involve more people in a process that pro-
duces a wider range of options in a less hostile (read confronta-
77. There is a growing literature, mostly written by consulting firms, on siting
criteria. Basically, after an inventory of the area's waste-management needs is deter-
mined, a ntimber of technical and non-technical screens are applied to target areas.
The first screen or group of screens is to exclude sites and focuses on factors such as
the geological and hydrological conditions of the soils in the area, the proximity of the
site to population concentrations, and whether higher uses exist for the potential site.
One obvious purpose of the screens is to exclude locations such as flood plains, al-
though in some places this is hard to do because almost everyplace is technically
classified as a flood plain. After the exclusion screens, an attempt is made to find sites
that can physically support the facility and that do not excite too much public opposi-
tion. See 2 Arthur D. Little, A Plan for the Development of Hazardous Waste Man-
agement Facilities in the New England Region (Sept. 1979); Delaware Basin
Commission & New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Technical Cri-
teria for Identification and Screening of Sites for Hazardous Waste Facilities (Envi-
ronmental Resources Management, Inc., Dec. 1979).
78. Am. S.B. 269, 1980 Ohio Laws 5-500, -502 (1980) (to be codified at OHIO REV.
STAT. ANN. § 3734.05(C)(3)).
79. See generally Tarlock, An Economic Analyrr' of Direct Voter Participation in
Zoning Change, I UCLA J. OF ENvTL. L. & POL'Y, 31 (1980).
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tional) situation. Two options that are currently being actively
explored are mediation and arbitration. Mediation may either in-
volve "intervention" before a situation becomes a focused conflict
or may involve an attempt to reach agreement among parties with
well defined adverse interests.80 Mediation attempts to find a rele-
vant negotiating group to approve a solution that may or may not
be in the power of the group to implement and as one practitioner
of the art has said, "the only basis for mediating disputes is fear-
fear that something worse will happen ... ."81 Mediation is an
evolving art that is highly dependent on the trust placed in the
mediators by the participants so at the present time we have only
scattered case studies, but no rules as to how the process should
work. Arbitration is a more formal process in which the relevant
parties (one hopes) voluntarily submit the dispute to someone who
will render a binding decision. Considerable effort is now being
made to arbitrate disputes in which the many parties that are nec-
essary to a final resolution have no formal interest in the outcome
of the conflict, and at least two states, Massachusetts and Wiscon-
Sih,82 hope to apply this evolving dispute-management process to
the siting of hazardous-waste management facilities.
IV.
FACILITY SITING LEGISLATION
States with hazardous-waste legislation dealing with facility sit-
ing can be roughly divided into two categories. The first consists
of states that have enacted RCRA qualifying legislation and the
second consists of states that have enacted specific siting proce-
dures. Both categories deal with the problem of local preemption
of land-use controls in different ways.
1. General RCRA Qualifying Legislation
RCRA qualifying legislation contains a definition of hazardous
80. See generally Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv.
305 (1971).
81. Dembart & Kwartler, The Snoqualamie River Conflict: Bringing Mediation into
Environmental Disputes, in ROUNDTABLE JUSTICE: STUDIES IN CONFLICT RESOLU-
TION-REPORTS TO THE FORD FOUNDATION 39 (R. Goldman ed. 1980). See also
ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS (L. Lake ed. 1980).
82. Wisconsin Legislative Council Proposed Bill 283 (not yet introduced in either
house) proposes a scheme of negotiations conducted between the applicant and a lo-
cal committee composed of interested representatives of affected units of local govern-
ment. The negotiations may be conducted with the aid of a mediator, if both parties
request one at any time in the negotiations.
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waste, a requirement that haulers and facility operators obtain a
state permit, and procedures and financing mechanisms to protect
the public after the facility is closed.8 3 Local preemption is gener-
ally not addressed or dealt with by a simple preemption-local op-
tion strategy.
Alabama,84 Arkansas,85 California,8 6 Iowa s8 and Kansas88 ap-
pear to have preempted local land-use controls, and therefore a
state permit is the only approval necessary to site a facility in these
states. Arizona apparently preempts local land-use controls as
well, but local entities have a greater chance of influencing the
selection process because the issue is made a visible state-wide
political choice. The Department of Health Services is directed to
select a site and to present the choice to the legislature for ap-
proval or disapproval.8 9 Local land-use authority is expressly pre-
served in Kentucky,90 Louisiana,91 and Nebraska. 92 Finally, the
legislation in Delaware,93 Georgia,94 Missouri, 95 Mississippi,96
New Mexico, 97 Oklahoma, 98 South Carolina," and Tennessee'00
is silent on the issue of preemption.
2. Special Siting Procedures
Hazardous-waste-facility siting processes may require the prep-
aration of plans or site inventories, the creation of permanent or
ad hoc siting boards,' 0' modeled somewhat on powerplant siting
83. For an analysis of state laws enacted prior to 1980 see National Conference of
State Legislatures, Hazardous Waste Management: A Survey of State Laws 1976-
1979 (1980).
84. ALA. CODE § 22-30-12(c) (Supp. 1981).
85. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-4202, -4205 (Supp. 1981).
86. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25100 (West Supp. 1980). See 57 Ops. CaL
Att'y Gen. 159 (1974).
87. Act of May 11, 1981, S.F. 420, § 8, 1981 Iowa Leg. Serv. 194 (\Vest).
88. Act of Apr. 17, 1981, ch. 251, § 8, 1981 Kan. Sess. Laws 1036.
89. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2801 to -2805 (Supp. 1980).
90. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 224.855(5), .866 (1980).
91. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:1144(B) (West Supp. 1980).
92. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1521.02 (R.S. Cum. Supp. 1980).
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6307 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-2907 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
95. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 260.375 (Vernon Int. Supp. 1981).
96. Miss. CODE ANN. § 17-17-27 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
97. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-7-4.2 (1981).
98. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2757 (West Supp. 1980-81).
99. S.C. CODE § 44-56-60 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
100. TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-6308 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
101. E.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1105 (McKinney 1981).
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boards created in the 1970's, 102 and the review of sites selected by
private and public entities. Responses to the problem of local
land-use authority ranges from straight preemption to the use pro-
cedures that virtually guarantee that local communities may veto
a facility of which they disapprove. At the outset it should be
noted that state legislatures possess unlimited power to preempt
local land-use regulations dealing with hazardous-waste facility
siting. Local units of government possess no inherent powers,10 3
and in non-home-rule states they are at the complete mercy of the
state legislature. In home-rule states, local government power is
limited to local as opposed to statewide matters, 1°4 but the provi-
sion of adequate hazardous-waste management sites is clearly a
statewide problem and the appropriate subject of state legislation.
Any argument to the contrary seems to have been disposed of by
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,10 5 discussed earlier. This sec-
tion discusses the distinctive features of special hazardous-waste
siting procedures that have evolved since 1979, the year that
Michigan adopted the first hazardous-waste facility siting statute.
A. Hazardous-Waste Facility Plans or Inventories
RCRA requires that each state prepare an inventory of existing
hazardous-waste sites, but there is no requirement that a state
have a process for selecting acceptable sites.10 6 Some states have
chosen to go beyond RCRA and to require the preparation of a
facility plan or inventory for new sites. For example, Michigan
requires the preparation of a plan that provides an inventory of
existing facilities and "a projection or determination of future
hazardous waste management needs."' 0 7 Maryland distinguishes
more sharply between an inventory and a plan10 8 because that
state's siting legislation contemplates state construction of facili-
ties. The Maryland Environmental Service (the state's agency for
sewer and other environmental-management-facility construction)
102. See Final Report of the Special Committee on Environmental Law, Develop-
ment and the Environment: Legal Reforms to Facilitate Industrial Site Selection
(1973).
103. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 297 U.S. 161 (1907).
104. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d 581, 393 N.Y.S.2d
949 (1977).
105. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 6933 (1980).
107. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 299.509(3)(c) (Supp. 1980).
108. MD. NAT. R.S. CODE ANN. § 3-710 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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must prepare an inventory of sites suitable for facilities'0 9 con-
structed and run by the state. The plan is prepared by the envi-
ronmental regulatory agency.
Preparation of a statewide inventory or plan is one of those sen-
sible ideas that may not work because the final product cannot
perform its intended function. Ideally, technical criteria can be
applied to screen out undesirable sites and to select desirable sites,
and relevant concerns can be addressed at the stage where the
consideration of alternatives is still feasible. But, ironically, the
better the plan or inventory, the less effective it may be in the end.
If specific sites are identified as suitable, as the National Gover-
nor's Association has noted, the plan or inventory "may trigger
vigorous local opposition at a time when there is little mobilized
force to counteract the opposition. This opposition force can...
result in the loss of sites before their merits are fully explored or
before meaningful and, perhaps, effective mitigations can be of-
fered."" 0 Michigan tries to deal with this problem by requiring
that the plan provide for "a reasonable geographic distribution of
disposal facilities"I within the state and that only "general loca-
tions""l2 need be specified. Minnesota's approach to the diversity
and alternatives issue is more direct. The inventory must include
at least three sites each for a commercial chemical processing fa-
cility, a commercial incinerator, and a commercial transfer and
storage facility." 13
If mandated plans are to be effective, they must be specific and
they must be followed. The dynamics of the planning process
generally lead planners to hedge their bets so that final plans sel-
dom delineate hard recommendations for specific pieces of lands.
In these situations, it is difficult to follow a plan because a wide
range of decisions are consistent with it. Hazardous-waste-facility
plans have a simpler function compared with general land-use
plans because the former must locate only one use and the techni-
cal criteria are more precise, but it will still be necessary to define
the relationship between the plan and the permit, if the plan is to
be taken seriously. Some states require plans but do not specify
109. Id.
110. National Governor's Association, Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities: Critical
Siting Issues-State Roles 7 (undated memorandum on file with author).
111. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.509(2)(a)-509(3)(c) (Supp. 1980).
112. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 299.515 (Supp. 1980).
113. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.09 (Supp. 1981).
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the relationship between the plan and subsequent permits. 114
Michigan has borrowed the land-use controls concept of consis-
tency with an adopted plan, and thus in theory the plan should
control the permit stage." 5 In recent years some courts and legis-
latures have bought the planners' arguments that land-use con-
trols should be subordinated to planning, but the evidence to date
suggests that mandated consistency between planning and land-
use controls will not increase the quality of plans and the weight
given to them."16 No consensus has developed about what consis-
tency means so the judicial implementation boils down to a gen-
eral and vague reasonableness test for specific rezonings.
Minnesota has attempted to avoid the problems of mandating
consistency by using the planning process not to make a final se-
lection of sites but to identify those sites that will be subjected to
intensive evaluation with substantial public participation." 7
Utah, on the other hand, has attempted to bind operators and the
public to the plan by making it costly for an operator to deviate
from the plan. The state's 1981 siting statute provides:
After adoption of the final plan, an applicant for approval of a
plan to construct and operate a hazardous waste treatment, storage,
and disposal facility who seeks protection under this act shall select
a site contained on the final site plan. Nothing in this act, however,
shall be construed to prohibit the construction and operation of an
approved hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facility
at a site which is not included within the final site plan, but such a
facility is not entitled to the protections afforded under this act. 118
B. Composition of the Siting Board
Siting boards, and in some states advisory boards to assist in the
preparation of the plan or inventory, are generally a mix of inter-
ested and presumptively neutral parties. Interested parties
predominate in many states, although those representing genera-
tors, transporters and facility operators are the minority."19 One
114. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §403.729(5) (Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-
2906(b) (Supp. 1980).
115. MICH. CoMP. LAWS AN. § 299.516 (Supp. 1980).
116. The cases and arguments pro and con for mandated subordination of regula-
tion to planning are reviewed in J. DIMENTO, THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE AND THE
LIMITS OF PLANNING (1980). See also Mandelker & Nelter, A New Rolefor the Com-
prehensive Plan, 332 LAND USE L. & ZONiNG Dio. 5 (Sept. 1981).
117. See infra notes 143-63.
118. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14(a)-6(6) (Interim Supp. 1981).
119. See, ag., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.508 (Supp. 1980).
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pattern is to select a board composed of members of the scientific
community, generally hydrologists and geologists, industry repre-
sentatives, state and local officials, and token members of the gen-
eral public. 120 Massachusetts departs from this model by creating
a twenty-one-person board composed of state officials, a "repre-
sentative of the public knowledgeable in environmental affairs,"
and six general-public members.' 2' Industry officials are ex-
pressly excluded from the council.
Siting boards that are composed of interested parties-both for
and against-might be vulnerable to the challenge that they deny
applicants and the general public due process of law because there
is a risk that contested issues have been prejudged. In California
the public due process rights to a fair process of decision have
been recognized in a case holding that a forestry board partially
charged with environmental regulation but dominated by industry
representatives was an invalid delegation of legislative power to
private parties.122 However, it is unlikely that courts will conclude
that the very structure of the siting boards denies due process to
applicants or to the public at large. The United States Supreme
Court has indicated that regulatory officials are presumed to act
fairly. 23 Furthermore, there are enough diverse interests repre-
sented on boards drawn from categorically interested groups to
insure that diverse view points will be heard and thus there is a
low risk that the issues have been prejudged.
Courts will probably follow the lead of the Maine supreme
court and reject a challenges based on "compositional" unfairness
as opposed to "prejudgment concerning issues of fact in a particu-
lar case."' 124 In Re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc. 12. considered a chal-
lenge to a decision of the Maine Environmental Improvement
Commission (EIC) denying an approval of a proposed petroleum
refinery on Penobscot Bay. The disappointed refinery operator
argued that the composition of the EIC was biased because it was
too pro-environmental, but the court's reasons for rejecting com-
120. See, eg., MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 3-703(b) (Supp. 1980).
121. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 4(13) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981).
122. Bayside Timber Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1. 97 Cal. Rptr.
431 (1971).
123. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941); Withrow v. Larkin. 421 U.S. 35
(1975).
124. N.H. Milk Dealers' Ass'n v. N.H. Milk Control Bd., 107 N.H. 335. 338, 222
A.2d 194, 198 (1966).
125. 310 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
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positional unfairness apply equally to a challenge that a board
with waste-management representatives is structurally unfair:
The composition of the EIC is necessarily broadly based because we
deem the legislature found it reasonable that many factors would
necessarily have to be considered in the regulating the location of
any development. . . . It seems clear to us that the legislature con-
sidered a variety of interests which it felt could best make the im-
portant decisions delegated to this commission. Its conclusion that
the five types of interests delineated in the statute could best serve
the public is completely reasonable.126
If, of course, an applicant or a member of the general public with
standing to raise the issue can prove that the questions regarding a
specific facility were prejudged then the court would invalidate
the decision and try to find a remedy that would insure a fair re-
consideration of the controversy.
C. To Preempt or Not to Preempt?
States have taken a wide variety of approaches to the role of
local land-use controls, and the obvious reason for the differences
among the states is the strength of the local units of government in
the state legislature. Five basic approaches have emerged. These
are: (1) straight state preemption; (2) state preemption of local
vetoes upon state review and an extraordinary majority of the sit-
ing authority; (3) state preemption after extensive local involve-
ment; (4) straight preservation of local veto authority; and (5) a
requirement that the operator and the local community negotiate
an agreement that offers rules to the community with arbitration
as a last resort (a model much favored by consultants and others
who find the adversary process too crude).
Maryland and Michigan have made the cleanest opposite
choices. Maryland's legislation states that local units of govern-
ment are given sufficient protection through the state siting-review
process and preempts all local land-use controls. 27 Similar legis-
lation exists in Ohio'2 8 and Utah.129 In Michigan the power of
local governments was sufficient to amend the siting act the year
126. Id. at 750. The court reiterated the familiar principle that "a state legislature
has the right, absent some unique constitutional prohibition, to determine the qualifi-
cations of those who are appointed to hold administrative offices." Maine boards
composed of directly interested regulated parties as well as public members were cited
as examples of the legislature's power.
127. MD. NAT. REs. CODE ArN. § 3-705(d) (Supp. 1980).
128. OHIo R v. CODE ANN. § 3734.05(D)(3). (Page Supp. 1980).
129. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14a-8 (Supp. 1981).
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after it was passed to preserve local land-use authority, thereby
legislating a double veto system.130 New York requires the siting
board to deny an application for site approval if the site is incon-
sistent with local zoning in force on the date of the application.' 3'
Connecticut and Florida give local communities the initial
move, but provide for state review and preemption. In Connecti-
cut a two-thirds vote of the siting board is necessary to override a
local veto. 132 In Florida local governments have ninety days to
veto a proposed site, subject to a three-stage appeal process. First,
the disappointed operator must apply for a local variance; if the
variance is denied he goes to the appropriate regional planning
council which may recommend that the Governor and Cabinet
approve or deny a variance.133 To recommend a variance the re-
gional planning council must make five findings including a deter-
mination that the facility will not have a significant adverse
impact on the environment and natural resources of the region.
The Governor and Cabinet have the authority to consider a wide
range of relevant factors including the need for the facility and
alternative sites. The discretion to issue a variance is severely
limited:
The Governor and Cabinet may grant a variance from local ordi-
nances, regulations, or plans only if the permit has been issued by
the department and if they find that there is a clear and convincing
need for the facility. A clear and convincing need for a facility is
established if the proposed method of storage, treatment, or disposal
of the hazardous waste to be handled at the proposed facility is the
most feasible method and if it seems probable that the proposed or
existing facility will be more advantageous economically to genera-
tors of hazardous waste at the proposed site than at possible alterna-
tive sites. 134
Pennsylvania's override procedure is less cumbersome, but the
130. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 299.516 as amended b, Pub. Acts 1980, No. 301 (MtcH.
STAT. ANN. (Current Legis.) at 80:1135 (1980)).
131. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSnRv. LAW § 27-1105(b)(2)(f) (McKinney 1981).
132. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-124 (West Supp. 1980).
133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.723. (West Supp. 1980).
134. Id. § 403.723(7)(c). Executive involvement in specific land use disputes is not
unknown in Florida. A full discussion of Florida's land-use planning legislation is
beyond the scope of this article, but it is important to note that the state has pioneered
in the development of areas of critical environmental concern and that the governor
and cabinet constitute the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission for the
purpose of reviewing local critical area designations. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.031(1)-
.05(I)(b) (West 1977). See generally Pelham, Regulating.4reas of Critical State Con.
cer" Florida and the Model Code, 18 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1980).
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state is equally exposed to political liability if it decides to reverse
a local veto. Local governments may recommend denial of a fa-
cility permit because they do not want the land use. The state
may refuse to follow the local unit's recommendation, but if it
does, a "written justification" must follow the decision.13 Similar
legislation was passed in Illinois in late 1981.136
A variant of the Florida and Pennsylvania preemption ap-
proaches that is somewhat less favorable to local units of govern-
ment may be found in Indiana's statute. In 1981 the state created
a Solid Waste Facility Site Approval Authority that consists of
five permanent statewide members and four local ad hoc members
choosen from the county and closest town where the facility is
proposed. 37 The authority's function is to issue certificates of en-
vironmental compatability. 38 These certificates are issued after
local authorities and planning boards are given notice of a pro-
posed facility and a formal public speechmaking hearing is held.
However, after these steps, all local land-use authority is bluntly
preempted: "The certificate granted under this chapter preempts
any local government zoning or other land use regulations, law or
ordinance, and the person obtaining this certificate shall not be
required to apply for any approval by any regional, county, city,
or town zoning board or authority."' 39 But, if one examines other
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.504 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82).
136. SB 172, re-enrolled (to be codified as ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111/,, paras. 1003,
1039.1 & 1040.1), provides for state preemption of local vetoes. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
111 , para. 1003(t) allows for state preemption of local denials of a "Regional Pollu-
tion Control Facility". This is "any waste storage site, sanitary landfill, waste disposal
site, waste transfer station or waste incinerator that exceeds or extends over the
boundaries of any local general purpose unit of government." Facilities located
within a general purpose unit of government and intended to serve only that govern-
ment and on-site waste management facilities are not regional pollution control facili-
ties. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 11 , para. 1039.1 allows city or county legislative bodies to
approve or disapprove the location of a regional pollution control facility pursuant to
six criteria. In addition to the usual land-use compatibility and safety standards, the
unit of local government must find that "the facility is necessary to accommodate the
waste needs of the area it is intended to serve." Local vetoes may be appealed to the
Pollution Control Board (PCB) by either the facility operator or a third party who
participated in the local legislative body hearing and who will be adversely affected
by the facility. No new evidence may be presented to the PCB. There are no stan-
dards to guide the state board in its decision to override the local veto other than that
they must consider the written decision of the local unit of government that denied
the facility the necessary permit to operate and the reasons offered for the denial. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 111 , para. 1040.1. As is usual in Illinois, the legislation does not
apply to Cook County or the city of Chicago.
137. IND. CODE 13-7-8.6-3 (1981).
138. IND. CODE 13-7-8.6-5 (1981).
139. IND. CODE 13-7-8.6-13(a) (1981).
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sections of the act, there are at least two specific duties imposed
upon the Authority to give substantial weight to local concerns. It
must consider
the impact on the county, town, or city in terms of the health,
safety, cost, and consistency with local planning and existing devel-
opment. To this end, the authority shall consider local ordinances,
permits, or other legal requirements and their potential relationship
to the proposed facility;14
The authority may mitigate specific concerns and objections to
the facility by attaching conditions and limitations to the certificate
for the facility
The authority shall, to the fullest extent practicable, integrate by
stipulation the provisions of local ordinances, permits, or require-
ments in making a determination granting a certificate.'
4
'
These duties to give weight to local interests become significant
when they are combined with the Authority's duty to give a writ-
ten explanation for its decision and the Indiana doctrine that due
process guarantees review of administrative decisions regardless
of whether a statutory basis exists.' 42 Preemption in Indiana is
possible, but it must be fully justified to avoid a reversal in court.
Minnesota is an example of the third preemption model. The
state has enacted an elaborate two-tier siting process that can
serve as a model of both industry and citizen representation and
of comprehensive consideration of alternative locations, but that
can also be a prescription for the siting of no facilities. A waste-
management board 43 is created to prepare plans,1'" reports,
45
and "preferred" site inventories, 46 assisted by a broad-based haz-
ardous-waste advisory council.' 47 The Board's specific duty is to
select six "candidate" sites, each in a different county, across the
state. 148 Local communities are entitled to an "early warning"
that a site in their area has been selected as a candidate site.'
49
This technique is borrowed from the de-institutionalization move-
140. IND. CODE 13-7-8.6-10(b)(4) (1981).
141. IND. CODE 13-7-8.6-12 (1981).
142. Salk v. Weinraub, - Ind. -, 390 N.E.2d 995 (1979).
143. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.0141 (West Supp. 1981).
144. Id. § 115A.11.
145. Id. § 115A.08.
146. Id. § 115A.09.
147. Id. § 115A.12.
148. Id. § 115A.21.
149. Id. § 115A.22(5).
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ment and is a response to community resistance to acceptance of
institutions for the socially undesirable. For each location se-
lected as a candidate site, a local project review committee,
charged with informing local interests and recording "local atti-
tudes and concerns", is formed. 50 After a further screen, certifi-
cates of need are issued for a sufficient number of sites to take care
of the state's needs after a finding that "waste reduction, separa-
tion, pretreatment, processing and resource recovery are not feasi-
ble and prudent alternatives."' 5' A certificate is conclusive on the
issue of need but nothing else.' 52 An environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) must be prepared and a license issued before a site can
operate, and there is no guarantee that a certified site will be al-
lowed to operate because the state is required to approve only one
site in the state. 53 The EIS program is begun by the disclosure of
documents revealing the proposed contents of the EIS, 54 which
may only be issued "following diligent efforts to involve the public
in determining the objective and content of the environmental im-
pact statement."155
After more hearings, 56 and notices of intent to issue permits;
the board decides whether to issue a permit for the site.' 57 Local
governments are entitled to six additional representatives on the
siting board but the quid pro quo is state preemption of local zon-
ing.158 They cannot bar the entry of a facility, but they can im-
pose reasonable "construction, inspection, operating, monitoring,
and maintenance" conditions.' 59 A reasonable condition is one
not reversed by the board.' 60
If the board considers the decision politically too hot, the board
has the discretion to buck it to a state legislative commission on
hazardous waste. This commission may suspend the proceedings
to conduct a "pre-intervention assessment" to determine if there
are substantive issues not considered in the formal proceedings
and if mediation might work.' 6' If the intervenor reports that one
150. Id. § 115A.22(2), (5).
151. Id. § 115A.24.
152. Id. § 115A.25(1).
153. Id. § 115A.26.
154. Id. § 115A.25(2).
155. Id. § 115A.25(3).
156. Id. § 115A.27.
157. Id. § 115A.28.
158. Id. § 115A.05(3).
159. Id. § 115A.28(2).
160. Id. § 115A.28(3).
161. Id. § 115A.29(I).
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of these conditions exists, the proceedings can be suspended for
another ninety days. Both the commission and the intervenor can
recommend a proposed agreement among the parties. 62 If the
board can implement the agreement, presumably a final permit
will issue, but if the intervention process produces recommenda-
tions beyond the competence of the board, the whole mess goes to
the legislature for resolution.163
Massachusetts has also enacted a two-tier siting process. Al-
though the powers of local communities appear to be quite strong
on paper, the statute creates more pressures on the state's cities to
accept a facility. 64 Basically, Massachusetts relies on state and
local siting-council review supplemented by developer bribes to
the community. The key permission under the Massachusetts pro-
cedure is not state siting-council approval, although such approval
is required, but rather a siting agreement negotiated between the
operator and the second-tier siting authority-the local assessment
committee formed after an operator proposes a facility. 165 Both
"host" and abutting community officials are represented on the
local committee, and the statute contemplates substantial "bribes"
both to the "host" and abutting communities, for the agreement
includes, inter alia, the following mandatory and optional
conditions:
(4) the services to be provided the developer by the host
community;
(5) the compensation, services, and special benefits that will be
provided to the host community by the developer, and the timing
and conditions of their provision;
(6) the services and benefits to be provided to the host
community by agencies of state government, and the timing and
condition of their provision;
(7) any provisions for tax prepayments or accelerated
payments, or for payments in lieu of taxes;
162. Id. § 115A.29(2).
163. Id. § 115A.29(3).
164. After this article was written, the first reported test of the Massachusetts law
cast doubt on this statement. IT Corporation of Wilmington, Delaware proposed to
construct an advanced-technology facility in Westford, Massachusetts, one of the
high-technology towns on the northwest rim of Boston, obtained Council approval,
but then the host community succeeded in blocking the site. The law prohibits the
community from rezoning the site after Council approval is given, but the town went
ahead with plans to rezone the site, a quarry, for residential use. After a heated meet-
ing attended by 3,000 of the town's 14,500 citizens, the quarry owner withdrew his
plan to sell the site to IT Corporation. N.Y. Times, October 17, 1981, at 1, coL 5.
165. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 5 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981).
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(8) provisions for renegotiation of any of the term, conditions
of provisions of the siting agreement, or of the entire agreement;
(9) provisions for resolving any disagreements in the
construction and interpretation of the siting agreement that may
arise between the parties; and
(10) appendices of the compensation to be paid abutting com-
munities established pursuant to the provisions of section fourteen.
The siting agreement may also include, but shall not be limited to,
the following:
(1) provisions for direct monetary payments from the
developer to the host community in addition to payments for taxes
and special services and compensation for demonstrable adverse
impacts;
(2) provisions to assure the health, safety, comfort, conven-
ience, and social and economic security of the host community and
its citizens .... 166
If the local assessment committee and the developer cannot nego-
tiate an agreement, they may ask the state siting council to find
that an impasse has occured. If the council agrees, the issues may
be referred to binding arbitration, 167 either before a single arbitra-
tor or a three-person panel.
D. Common Law and Statutory Remedies Against an
Improperly Operated Closed Site
Approval of a site does not guarantee the continued safe opera-
tion of the site, and thus regulatory approval may not quell com-
munity opposition and common-law based lawsuits. All states
have agencies with post-approval enforcement powers. Newer
statutes capitalize on the expansion of the concept of imminent
irreparable harm and give the agency the power to enjoin facilities
when operating practices or an episode causes public health
risks. 68 States also have the power to implement specific clean-up
procedures.' 69 In the future, efforts to prevent spills and other
hazards from creating long term damage or risks will be coordi-
nated with the EPA's administration of Superfund. 170 Not sur-
prisingly, statutes granting broad post-approval enforcement
powers do not deal with the problem of injunction actions by
166. Id. § 12.
167. Id. § 15.
168. See, e.g., Wis STAT. ANN. § 144.72 (West Supp. 1981).
169. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0916 (McKinney 1981); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 53-6308(c)(6) (Supp. 1981).
170. See supra note 12.
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nearby landowners or "host" communities, and the possibility of
successful suits has increased as a result of the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services,'7 1 dis-
cussed earlier.
Only one state has expressly foreclosed a Wilsonville result by
limiting landowners' adversely affected by the operation of the fa-
cility to inverse condemnation actions and barring all other in-
junction suits. Utah's statute provides:
(1) Before construction of a hazardous waste management facil-
ity, but in no case later than nine months after approval of a plan
for a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility, any
owner or user of property adversely affected by approval may bring
an action in a district court of competent jurisdiction against the
owner of the proposed facility. If the court determines that the
planned construction and operation of the hazardous waste manage-
ment facility will result in the devaluation of the plaintiff's property
or will otherwise interfere with the plaintiff's rights in the property,
it shall order the owners to compensate the plaintiff in an amount
equal to the value of the plaintiff's loss.
(2) The remedy provided in subsection (1) of this section is the
exclusive remedy for owners or users aggrieved by the proposed
construction and operation of a hazardous waste treatment, disposal
or storage facility, and no court has jurisdiction to enjoin the con-
struction or operation of any facility located at a site included in the
siting plan adopted by the committee.
(3) Nothing in this act shall prevent an owner or user of prop-
erty aggrieved by the construction and operation of a facility from
seeking damages that result from a subsequent modification of the
design or operation of a facility but such damages are limited to the
incremental damage that results from the modification. Any action
for such damages shall be brought within nine months after the
plans for modification of the design or operation of the facility are
approved.
(4) For the purpose of assessing damages, the value of the rights
affected is fixed at the date the facility plan is approved and the
actual value of the right at that date is the basis for the determina-
tion of the amount of damage suffered, and no improvements to the
property subsequent to the date of approval of the plans shall be
included in the assessement of damages. Similarly, for any subse-
quent modification of a facility, value is fixed at the date of approval
of the amended facility plan. 172
171. 86 M. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
172. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14a-7 (Supp. 1981). But see Note, Hazardous Vaste.
Preserving the Nuisance Remedy, 33 STAN. L. REv. 675, 690 (1981), which supports
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Utah's solution is controversial because landowners rights are
sharply reduced, but barring injunctive relief reenforces the integ-
rity of the entire siting process. A landowner has a constitutional
right to some form of nuisance remedy, but the Supreme Court
has made it clear that a property owner has no constitutional right
to any particular remedy so long as the available remedy does not
deny him due process. 173 It would seem to be well within the leg-
islature's constitutional discretion to decide that allowing private
suits for injunctive relief thwarts the public interest in obtaining
sufficient disposal capacity in the state, that the planning and per-
mit process adequately protects the public against unreasonable
risk and that landowners, the most obviously adversely affected
parties, are adequately compensated if they can obtain damages
for demonstrable injuries. Cities, of course, have no constitutional
rights against the state, so the state may provide them with
whatever remedies to protect the health of their citizens that it
chooses. 174 It is significant that the Supreme Court has recently
endorsed inverse condemnation as a remedy superior to specific
relief in many cases involving damages from land use
regulation. 75
CONCLUSION
State hazardous-waste siting statutes represent a significant ef-
fort on the part of states to accommodate management approaches
to hazardous-wastes treatment, disposal and storage and public
opposition to any risk exposure. Each process now in place must
be viewed as an experiment because there is no consensus that the
siting problem is as urgent as many have assumed or that any mix
of technical expertise and public participation will produce deci-
sions that are widely accepted as legitimate. But, if one accepts
the assumption that there is a need for modem off-site treatment,
disposal and storage facilities that is not currently being met by
the private sector, it is clear that any siting process must be strong
enough to do the job. At a minimum a statewide body must have
the power to preempt local land-use regulations and to reach an
expeditious decision after relevant concerns are heard. It may be
that this first generation of statutes will be inadequate to meet the
the retention of full common-law remedies because "courts can offer. . . the public
perception of legitimacy, a quality sorely lacking in hazardous waste regulation."
173. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
174. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
175. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 345 (1981).
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need for facilities and that even stronger state agencies must be
created. One model currently being discussed is a regional or
even inter-state agency with the power of eminent domain. Or it
may be that "public understanding and acceptance of waste man-
agement facilities may preclude the need for such strong state au-
thority.' 176 It will be necessary to monitor the efforts of the
agencies now trying to site facilities to determine just how effec-
tive the current statutes will prove to be.
176. Final Report of the Second Keystone Workshop on Siting Nonradioactive
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities 11 (Feb. 1981). Giving private entities the
power of eminent domain may still not solve all local opposition problems. Cf. Earth
Management, Inc. v. Heard County, 248 Ga. 442, 283 S.E.2d 445 (1981) (condemna-
tion of proposed hazardous-waste-facility site for a park void because the power of
eminent domain was exercised in bad faith.)
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